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21 Introduction
Capital structure plays a unique role in the real estate industry due to the suitabil-
ity of the underlying assets as debt security and the almost unique tax treatment
afforded to REITs. All real estate firms, be they REITs or not, must consider at
least two dimensions when making capital structure choices: the amount of debt
(leverage) and the term of the debt contract (maturity). While several studies have
explored the determinants of each of these two dimensions separately, very little is
known about the interdependence between them. In this paper we explore the nature
of the joint determinants of leverage and maturity in real estate firms.
Traditional capital structure studies tend to focus on either leverage or maturity,
implicitly assuming that these are determined separately (Barclay and Smith, 1995;
Guedes and Opler, 1996). Some studies consider the influence of maturity on leverage
or vice-versa, but only as a control variable in an otherwise single-equation setting
(Stohs and Mauer, 1996). However, there is increasing support for a clear interde-
pendence between leverage and maturity. Leland and Toft (1996) argue that optimal
leverage is a function of firm risk, expected bankruptcy costs and maturity. Indi-
rectly they argue that firms choose maturity first, then determine the corresponding
value-maximising level of leverage. In contrast, Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010) suggest
that firms determine the maturity of a debt issuance only once they have chosen to
issue debt. They argue that optimal maturity is a monotonic function of leverage.
Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003), in empirical examinations of
the joint nature of leverage and maturity choices in U.S. equities, find support for
both functional dependencies. We explicitly focus our analysis on the relationship
between leverage and maturity for a sample of listed U.S. real estate companies and
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and find that it is richer than often assumed.
Capital structure choices of real estate companies are of particular interest as these
firms can choose between different forms of corporate organisation, each having sig-
nificant implications for capital structure choices. Under the REIT regime, firms are
able to significantly reduce corporate tax liabilities, often to the point of eliminat-
ing them altogether. In order to achieve this reduction in corporate tax liabilities,
REITs must satisfy certain conditions including distributing the majority of taxable
income as dividends, investing a minimum percentage of capital in the real estate
sector and maintaining a diversified ownership base 2 .
2 The exact conditions differ from country to country, see e.g. Lehman and Roth (2010).
3Non-REIT real estate firms are not required to meet these conditions, and do not
receive preferential tax treatment. Given that both REITs and non-REITs generally
invest in the same underlying asset class, it follows that the real estate industry
provides a useful natural experiment on the role of regulation and taxation on capital
structure decisions.
We examine the interdependence of the leverage and maturity choices using a three-
stage least squares (3SLS) regression that controls for the endogeneity between
leverage and maturity, along with the likely correlation between the errors of the
two simultaneous equations. 3SLS allows us to isolate the separate determinants of
leverage and maturity as well as to explore whether leverage influences maturity
or vice-versa. We estimate all equations for REITs and non-REITS separately in
order to analyse the effect of the REIT regulations on the nature of the relationship
between leverage and maturity.
We find that the drivers of capital structure choices in real estate companies and
REITs and particularly the differences in the nature of the interdependence between
their leverage and maturity choices clearly reflect the effects of the REIT regulation.
We find support for the trade-off theory of leverage in non-REITs, and we also find
that maturity is a function of leverage for non-REITs. Evidence for a pecking order
in REIT capital structure, rather than trade-off theory, is not surprising given the
absence of corporate taxes. The support we find for an inverse relationship between
maturity and leverage is in line with the theory put forward in Leland and Toft
(1996) once we consider adverse selection costs of equity.
In brief, REIT regulation appears to free up scope in the capital structure to pursue
more offensive financing strategies such as signalling firm quality to the market
and optimising transaction costs, while non-REITs largely seem to focus on the
mitigation of tax, agency costs and refinancing risk. Our results suggest that the
relationship between leverage and maturity can also be used to moderate the effects
of other exogenous financing policies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant traditional capital
structure literature, Section 3 introduces the functional relationship between leverage
and maturity as suggested in Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010). Section 4 provides details
on data and methodology and Section 5 discusses the empirical results of our study.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Traditional capital structure literature often implicitly assumes independence of
leverage and maturity choices. However, Leland and Toft (1996) develop the theory
that optimal leverage is a monotonic function of maturity to maximise firm value. In
the next section, we present the theory developed in Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010),
who argue that maturity is a monotonic function of leverage to reduce the expected
cost of debt. Empirically, Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) find that leverage and ma-
turity are substitutes to mitigate the underinvestment problem. Johnson (2003) finds
that leverage and maturity are complements to reduce refinancing risk. Research into
the joint determination of leverage and maturity in real estate is especially sparse.
Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) study joint leverage and maturity choices
in REITs. They find that leverage and maturity appear to be substitutes in the
sense of Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003).
There are two main traditional theories explaining leverage choices in isolation. The
trade-off theory posits a value-maximising debt ratio where the marginal bankruptcy
costs and tax benefits of debt are equal. 3 However, REITs are exempt from corpo-
rate tax if they distribute 90% of taxable income as dividends, which nullifies the
tax and agency cost shields of debt. Theoretically, Howe and Shilling (1988) assert
that in the absence of tax benefits, REITs cannot compete for debt and will favour
equity. Similarly, Shilling (1994) argues that REIT value is maximised for equity-
only financing. Consistent with expectations, Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans (1997) find
that REITs raise more capital through seasoned equity than debt. Boudry, Kallberg,
and Liu (2010) study issuance decisions of REITs. They find that REITs are less
likely to issue debt when bankruptcy costs are high and interpret this as support for
the trade-off theory. Brown and Riddiough (2003) examine public financial offerings
of REITs and find that, consistent with the existence of an optimal leverage ratio
implied in trade-off theory, REITs appear to target a leverage ratio. However, this
targeting strategy appears to be motivated by the maintenance of an investment-
grade rating.
The pecking order theory 4 claims that capital structure changes reflect a need for
external funds given the higher informational sensitivity and thus adverse selection
cost of equity.
3 Variations are explored in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); Jensen (1986); Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)
and Modigliani and Miller (1963).
4 See e.g. Donaldson (1961); Myers (1984); Myers and Majluf (1984); Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
4
However, there are conflicting views on information asymmetry in real estate. Boudry,
Kallberg, and Liu (2010) argue that REITs especially are a fairly transparent invest-
ment vehicle as they focus on cash yields and stable cash flows from the operation of
real estate, thereby questioning the source of any asymmetric information. On the
other hand, Han (2006) argues that accurate real estate valuation requires sophisti-
cated local knowledge, thus increasing information asymmetry.
Moreover, pecking order assumes discretion over earnings, debt and equity. However,
REIT pay-out requirements restrict funding choices to debt and equity. Accordingly,
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) find no evidence for pecking order in REIT financ-
ing choices. Nevertheless, several studies confirm the negative price and valuation ef-
fects of equity issues implied in pecking order (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2001; Ghosh,
Nag, and Sirmans, 1999, 2000; Howe and Shilling, 1988). More specifically, Feng,
Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) show that REITs balance the lack of incentive for debt
and the adverse selection cost of equity.
There are two main theories explaining maturity choices in isolation. Myers (1977)
suggests that matching debt and asset maturity helps mitigate underinvestment.
However, Kolb (1987) points out that strict adherence to the asset matching principle
implies a current ratio of one and thus increased refinancing risk. Hart (1993) posits
an inverse relationship between maturity and growth opportunities as short-term
debt mitigates underinvestment. Empirics largely support both theories (Barclay
and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996).
Flannery (1986) develops an inverse relationship between debt maturity and firm
quality. High quality is signalled through issuing short-term debt to exploit favourable
refinancing terms. The liquidity risk theory (Diamond, 1991; Sharpe, 1991; Titman,
1992) predicts an inverse relationship between credit rating and debt maturity as
lower-rated firms attempt to avoid risky refinancing events. Empirically, Guedes and
Opler (1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) confirm this theory.
Research into maturity choices in real estate is sparse. Howe and Shilling (1988) find
REIT stock prices increase after short-term debt issues, confirming the signalling
hypothesis. Brown and Riddiough (2003) find a negative relationship between REIT
debt maturity and credit ratings, consistent with the liquidity risk theory. Highfield,
Roskelley, and Zhao (2007) find little evidence for signalling and liquidity risk in
REITs but confirm the influence of personal taxes and agency problems.
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3 Debt maturity as a function of leverage
3.1 Leverage as a function of maturity
Leland and Toft (1996) examine the optimal capital structure of a firm that can
choose leverage and maturity. They argue that optimal leverage is a function of
firm risk, expected bankruptcy costs and maturity. Indirectly they argue that firms
choose maturity first, then determine the corresponding value-maximising level of
leverage. More specifically, they show that the optimal, value-maximising leverage
ratio increases with maturity.
3.2 Debt maturity in the simple Merton framework
Following Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) develops pricing structures for
risky corporate debt in the absence of bankruptcy costs and debt covenants. In
Merton’s model, the value of risky debt is given by the value of a riskless bond less
a European put option on the underlying value of the firm, struck at the face value
of debt. Merton illustrates a monotonic relationship between volatility and optimal
leverage, and a similar monotonic relationship between volatility and optimal debt
maturity. While not explicitly identifying the direct relationship between leverage
and maturity, Merton’s framework can be used to identify the a clear functional
relationship between leverage and optimal maturity of risky debt.
In the Merton framework, the value of a risky zero-coupon bond (ZCB) is given by:
D0 = e
−rfTX − P0 = Xe−rfTN(d2) + V e−qTN(−d1), (1)
where d1 =
ln V
X
+ (rf − q + σ
2
2 )T
σ
√
T
, d2 = d1 − σ
√
T ,
where e−rTX is the face value of the bond discounted at the risk-free rate and the
put option 5 represents the expected losses due to default.
From Merton’s valuation of risky debt the default-risk premium, λ, is given by:
λ = −
(
rf +
1
T
ln
[
e−rfTN(d2) +
V
X
N(−d1)
])
. (2)
5 And where, as per standard notation, r is the risk-free rate of return, q is the continuous dividend, T is
the maturity of the bond and σ is the volatility of V the value of the firm.
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The default-risk premium is a non-linear function of maturity (T ), leverage (X/V ),
volatility (σ), and the risk-free rate (rf ). Table 1 presents the risk premium of
risky debt calculated for various levels of leverage and maturity in the absence of
bankruptcy costs. The risk premium for firms with low leverage is monotonically
related to term to maturity. At higher levels of debt, the risk premium for risky
debt is negatively related to term to maturity. The total costs of debt (without
bankruptcy costs) for both one and two year ZCBs over a 2 year period can be
determined from the risk premium in Table 1.
In the absence of bankruptcy costs, the total cost of debt incurred by issuing suc-
cessive 1 year ZCB is not necessarily greater than the costs incurred by issuing a
single 2 year ZCB. The non-linear relationship between maturity, leverage and risk
premium, in Table 1, implies that the cheaper debt instrument is determined by
the leverage ratio. As illustrated in Figure 1a, a high leverage ratio implies that
longer-term debt is cheaper. Conversely, a lower leverage ratio implies a lower cost
of debt for the short-term instrument. The expected proportional loss due to default
for a highly levered firm appears to dissipate slowly over time. In order to minimise
the costs of debt under Merton’s assumptions, the debt maturity strategy of firms
should be monotonically related to leverage.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figure 1a about here]
Table 1 does not suggest that at some critical leverage ratio, firms should change
their optimal maturity from short term debt to long term debt. Rather, Table 1
illustrates the point that when firms with higher pre-issuance leverage issue debt,
the new issuance should be longer term debt. Consequently, the duration of the
firm’s entire debt portfolio will increase slightly. Therefore, the weighted average
debt maturity for the firm will monotonically increase with leverage.
This implies that the relationship between debt maturity and debt leverage is mono-
tonic. The leverage level at which crossover occurs is largely insensitive to the level
of bankruptcy costs.
[Figure 1b about here]
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4 Data and Methodology
We examine the capital structure choices of U.S. listed real estate companies (Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6500 to 6552) and REITs (SIC code 6798)
during the period 1973, the first year for which Compustat has complete debt ma-
turity data, to 2006, the last full year of data prior to the global financial crisis. Our
final sample consists of 189 (916) firm-year observations for REITs (non-REITs). All
variables except volatility and abnormal earnings are measured at the fiscal year-end
prior to the year in which leverage and maturity are measured (Billett, King, and
Mauer, 2007; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2005; Johnson, 2003).
Leverage and maturity choices are commonly investigated in single equation models
that do not accommodate for the possibility of joint determination, thereby implic-
itly assuming exogeneity of predictors and i.i.d. distribution of errors that also have
to be unrelated to the regressors. If one of the predictors is not exogenous, single
equation results may suffer from omitted variable bias. If errors are not independent,
estimates are likely to be inconsistent (simultaneity bias).
We adopt three-stage least squares (3SLS) to investigate the nature of the joint
determination of leverage and maturity. 3SLS allows us to estimate the bidirectional
effects between leverage and maturity and can achieve a more efficient estimation
than two-stage least squares by exploiting cross-equation correlation of errors. Pagan
and Hall’s (1983) heteroscedasticity tests are performed in each equation and do not
indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity.
Proxies for Maturity Hypotheses
The measurement of debt maturity varies in the literature. Fortunately, Scherr and
Hulburt (2001) report that the use of different measurements has little impact on
empirical results. We follow Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and use the ratio of
a firm’s long-term debt (debt due after three years) to total debt as our proxy for
maturity.
Following the debt maturity literature (Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007; Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2005; Stohs and Mauer, 1996), we measure leverage
by the ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus current liabilities) to market value of
assets (book value of assets less book value of common equity plus market value of
common equity).
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Two factors complicate the empirical identification of a positive relationship between
leverage and maturity as posited in Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010). First, Figures 3a
(non-REITs) and 5a (REITs) show that most firms generally have a high proportion
of long-term debt, suggesting that our measurement of long-term debt is conserva-
tive. Secondly, the measurements of maturity and leverage in this study (and most
other debt maturity studies) are inversely related to each other. Any support for a
positive relationship between leverage and maturity or a negative relationship be-
tween maturity and leverage will therefore be an underestimate of the strength and
direction of the true relationship.
[Figures 3a, 3b, 5a, 5b about here]
Following Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao (2007) we use the ratio of gross depreciable
property to depreciation expense to proxy asset maturity, and transform it using a
natural logarithm to correct the skewness of the measure. Growth opportunities are
measured by the market-to-book ratio, i.e. the market value of assets divided by
the book value of assets (Johnson, 2003). Barclay and Smith (1995) and Barclay,
Marx, and Smith (2003) suggest the use of abnormal earnings as a proxy for firm
quality, as annual earnings tend to follow a random walk (Kleidon, 1986; Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986). We measure abnormal earnings by the difference between
earning per share (EPS) in year t+1 and EPS in year t, divided by the year t share
price. Following Stohs and Mauer (1996), we measure firm size by the log of firm
market value, deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI).
[Tables 2 about here]
The slope of the interest rate term structure is measured by the difference between
the month-end yields on a 10-year government bond and a 6-month government
bond, matched to the month of a firm’s fiscal year end. Bond yields have been
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Economic Database. Earnings
volatility is added to the maturity equation as a measure of credit risk, the effects of
which potentially crowd firms with volatile earnings out of the public debt market.
Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over
the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by the average assets for that period
(Johnson, 2003). Unrated firms tend to have lower credit quality than rated firms
and hence are more likely to find difficulty in issuing long term public debt.
9
Following Johnson (2003), we include a debt rating dummy (rated=1; otherwise=0)
in the maturity equation to control for credit risk. Finally, we include year dummy
variables in the debt maturity regression to control for the effects of latent macroe-
conomic event shock factors.
Proxies for Leverage Hypotheses
Following the corporate leverage literature 6 , a set of common predictors of leverage
are included in the leverage equation. Firms with high growth opportunities should
use lower leverage to avoid underinvestment problems (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
The inclusion of abnormal earnings is used to control for signalling effects in leverage
choices (Ross, 1977). Larger firms (size) are likely to face lower asymmetric infor-
mation problems, hence they might use more equity than debt (Myers and Majluf,
1984). Firms with highly volatile earnings (as defined above) use less debt (Bradley,
Jarrell, and Kim, 1984).
Fixed-assets ratio is defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided by the
book value of assets in the leverage equation. Investors in firms with more tangible
assets use leverage to extract information about the relative value of liquidation and
to monitor management (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Williamson, 1988). Profitability
is defined as the ratio of EBITDA to book value of assets and is used to control for
changes in leverage resulting from the (dynamic) pecking order theory (Donaldson,
1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984), which implies that profitable firms use less debt.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that firms with alternative tax shields have
less incentive to utilise tax benefits generated from interest payments. We include
investment tax credit as a dummy that equals one in the presence of tax credits and
zero otherwise. We also include a net operating losses carried forward dummy that
equals one in the presence of carryforwards and zero otherwise.
6 For a set of firm characteristics that affect leverage in leverage studies, see Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian
(2004) and Flannery and Rangan (2006).
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 (Table 3) shows the distribution of debt maturity and leverage between
1973 to 2006 for non-REITs (REITs). REITs tend to borrow longer term debt than
non-REITs. REITs might benefit from better access to long-term debt and face
fewer refinancing risks. There is no significant difference in the leverage of the two
firm types. Figure 2 (Figure 4) shows the debt maturity pattern of non-REITs (RE-
ITs) over the study period. The main differences are that REIT maturity is more
volatile than for non-REITs. Second, non-REIT maturity appears to decrease prior
to financial crises, while REIT maturity appears to increase at those times.
Panel B of Tables 2 (non-REITs) and 3 (REITs) presents descriptive statistics for all
variables over the study period. Simple t-tests are employed to detect statistically
significant differences. The mean and median of firm size for non-REITs ($245.61mil,
$51.63mil) are statistically smaller than those for REITs ($1,895mil, $3.89.63mil).
To minimise any undue influence of outliers, we winsorise the variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Non-REITs have average asset maturity of 23.10 years, similar to
that of REITs (26.05 years), but both are higher than for industrial firms (Billett,
King, and Mauer, 2007) (12.06 years), consistent with the notion that the useful
life of real estate assets is very long. Non-REIT growth opportunities (1.42) are
higher than for REITs (1.26). Lower growth opportunities in REITs, which are
generally viewed as value-stocks, might suggest that some aspects of debt-equity
agency conflicts are of lesser concern. REIT earnings volatility (0.04) is significantly
lower than for non-REITs (0.06). This is consistent with the view that REITs focus
on stable income streams from the operation of real estate (Boudry, Kallberg, and
Liu, 2010). REITs have significantly higher fixed assets ratios than non-REITs (0.58
vs. 0.46), which reflects the composition of the non-REIT sample that includes agents
and managers who do not own the property. However, we find that the 3SLS results
are qualitatively similar when this category (SIC 6531) is excluded. Also, we find
significant differences in the proportion of firm-years with alternative tax shields, and
REITs have significantly more observations with debt ratings, intuitively consistent
with the composition of the non-REIT sample and the corresponding firm sizes.
Tables 4 and 5 present the Pearson correlation matrix among the measures of all
dependent and independent variables for the period of 1973 to 2006. The matrix
shows low levels of correlation between most independent variables.
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5 Results
5.1 The interdependence of leverage and maturity
The 3SLS results for the relationships between the leverage and maturity choices
of real estate companies and REITs together with their predictors are reported in
Table 6. The 3SLS setting accommodates for the hypothesised endogeneity and si-
multaneity of leverage and maturity while controlling for the individual leverage
and maturity determinants commonly supported in the literature. We find that the
drivers of capital structure choices in real estate companies and REITs and particu-
larly the differences in the nature of the interdependence between their leverage and
maturity choices clearly reflect the effects of the REIT regulation.
We find that non-REIT debt maturity is positively related to leverage, but we find no
support for the reverse, that is, non-REIT leverage is not a function of maturity. Our
finding is consistent with major US-equity debt maturity studies (Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman, 2005; Johnson, 2003; Stohs and Mauer, 1996) and has several
implications. First, the unidirectional nature of the relationship suggests that real
estate companies determine leverage exogenously and then choose the corresponding
maturity. Second, the fact that the relationship is positive supports the hypothesis
that, for a given level of leverage, real estate companies choose maturity in order
to reduce expected costs of debt in the sense of Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010).
Third, the lack of evidence for the simultaneity theory developed in Barclay, Marx,
and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003), suggests that real estate companies use the
leverage and maturity dimensions of capital structure for different purposes rather
than regarding them as complements or substitutes.
Conversely, we find that REIT leverage is inversely related to maturity. We find no
evidence for a reverse causality. REITs determine maturity exogenously and the cor-
responding level of leverage follows. At first sight, the direction of this relationship
contradicts the theory developed in Leland and Toft (1996), an interesting result,
which we examine in detail below. Our results also suggest that REITs employ lever-
age and maturity for different purposes. Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008)
study REIT leverage and maturity choices in a 2SLS setting and find that leverage
is inversely related to maturity. In line with Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), they
also confirm the reverse. The contrast to our results highlights the value of 3SLS in
the analysis of potential endogeneity in capital structure choices.
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The lack of evidence for endogeneity between leverage and maturity in both firm
types may suggest that unregulated firms have an incentive to choose an optimal
target level of leverage first, which is followed by the determination of a correspond-
ing level of maturity. On the other hand, regulated firms do not appear to have
an a priori preference for a specific debt level, hence optimal maturity is chosen
first, and leverage follows. In this argument, the regulatory situation of a firm would
determine the incentive structure for prioritising leverage over maturity choices or
vice versa. This finding would imply that leverage and maturity can only be chosen
simultaneously if the incentives for prioritising the determination of one dimension
over the other exactly offset each other. Only in this case would a firm be able
to view leverage and maturity as complements or substitutes, depending on other
firm-specific characteristics.
5.2 The determinants of leverage
Non-REITs determine leverage first as they have an incentive to follow the trade-off
theory and choose an optimal level of leverage to mitigate corporate taxes. We find
strong empirical support for the adherence of non-REITs to the trade-off theory,
as operating losses carried forward and investment tax credit are significant in the
determination of leverage, and investment tax credit correctly carries a negative sign.
Contrary to expectations, the operating losses carried forward dummy has a positive
sign. This finding is consistent with Johnson (2003) who suggests that firms with
losses carried forward have higher leverage as losses reduce relative equity values.
Inconsistent with the trade-off theory, the term structure of interest rates is insignif-
icant in the determination of non-REIT debt maturity. However, previous empirical
results for the term structure hypothesis are mixed. Barclay and Smith (1995) find a
statistically (not economically) significant positive relationship between term struc-
ture and maturity but they do not control for leverage. Guedes and Opler (1996)
find a statistically negative relationship. In U.S. studies, and after controlling for
leverage, Johnson (2003) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) do not find support for the
term structure hypothesis. Our results are consistent with Johnson (2003).
We find no support for a pecking order in the capital structure of real estate com-
panies. In the presence of corporate taxes, real estate companies appear to pursue a
more defensive leverage strategy and target a long-term optimal capital structure,
trading off means to mitigate corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs of debt.
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The evidence we find for the trade-off theory in non-REITs is consistent with the
positive relationship we confirm between leverage and maturity. The target level of
leverage resulting from trade-off considerations determines the appropriate maturity
to manage the ensuing cost of debt.
In the absence of corporate taxes on the other hand, REITs have no a priori pref-
erence for an optimal target level of debt. REITs do not follow the trade-off theory.
The alternative tax shield dummies are insignificant in their capital structure choices.
Consistent with non-adherence to the trade-off theory, the term structure of interest
rates is also insignificant in REIT maturity choices. Brick and Ravid (1985) develop
their theory on the basis that the corporate tax rate exceeds the personal tax rate.
Therefore, our finding is appropriate as the tax-exempt status of REITs renders
accelerated tax benefits through higher long-term interest rates largely obsolete.
We find that REITs follow the more offensive pecking order to actively secure the
cheapest funds based on their level of asymmetric information content. This finding is
in line with Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) and Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans
(2008). However, contrary to expectations based on an inverse relationship between
firm size and the severity of asymmetric information problems (Myers and Majluf,
1984), it carries a positive sign. Larger REITs use more leverage.
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) argue that REITs are fairly transparent as they
tend to focus on high yields from operations rather than capital appreciation, which
stabilises cash flows. The authors question the source of any asymmetric informa-
tion in REITs and thus the applicability of the pecking order theory. Our findings
suggest that the inherent lack of transparency in real estate as an asset class (Han,
2006) generates the asymmetric information that underlies the pecking order theory.
This problem is likely to be exacerbated for larger REITs, possibly with a diversified
asset base. When there are no corporate taxes, the information asymmetry resulting
from the detailed local market knowledge required to accurately value real estate
assets appears to be a strong driver of capital structure given that it remains signif-
icant although the regulatory pay-out requirement restricts discretion over retained
earnings, normally a fundamental assumption of pecking order.
Apart from adhering to the trade-off theory in an attempt to mitigate corporate
taxes, the leverage choices of non-REITs are further driven by a number of similarly
defensive objectives, albeit with a focus on the mitigation of debt-related agency
costs.
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Growth opportunities and highly volatile earnings induce a reduction in non-REIT
leverage so as to mitigate agency costs of underinvestment as well as bankruptcy
costs and agency costs of debt in the sense of Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984). In
line with Harris and Raviv (1990) and Williamson (1988), our findings suggest that
non-REITs with higher proportions of tangible assets carry more debt as they tend
to have higher liquidation values. Managers respond to perceived investor prefer-
ences to use debt to generate information about when liquidation is more lucrative
than ongoing operations as well as to monitor management. Consistent with our in-
terpretation of non-REIT capital structure choices as defensive, we find no support
for the more offensive signalling theory (Flannery, 1986; Ross, 1977), as firm quality
carries the expected sign but is insignificant in the determination of leverage and
maturity.
In contrast, and as already hinted through the adherence to the pecking order, the
leverage choices of REITs follow a distinctly more offensive pattern. In line with
Howe and Shilling (1988), we find strong support for the signalling hypothesis, as
abnormal earnings carry a positive sign and are highly significant. In contrast to
real estate companies, REITs signal their quality to the market by issuing more
debt when mimicking this strategy is too costly for poor-quality firms. However,
REITs use only the leverage dimension of capital structure for signalling purposes
and employ maturity to pursue different objectives.
REITs also use leverage to mitigate agency costs - but on a very selective basis. This
is consistent with the argument that REITs suffer from fewer agency cost problems
as a result of their tight regulation. Consequently, we do not find support for a
positive relationship between leverage and the proportion of tangible assets (Harris
and Raviv, 1990; Williamson, 1988). In contrast to real estate companies, REIT
managers do not feel the need to respond to an investor preference for debt.
Smith (1986) argues that managers of regulated firms have less discretion over in-
vestment decisions, which improves investor insight into operations. Unlike for un-
regulated real estate companies, the regulated status of REITs reduces the value of
information and thus the incentive for investors to employ debt as a mechanism to
extract it. Rather, it appears that REITs employ leverage choices largely to mitigate
growth- and volatility-related agency costs of debt.
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However, REITs employ only the leverage dimension of capital structure for the
mitigation of growth-related agency costs. In contrast, they employ both dimensions
to mitigate volatility-related agency costs. Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) point
out that REITs are generally characterised by stable cash flows as they focus on the
yield from operations. Against this background, our results suggest that earnings
volatility is a strong driver of capital structure choices in terms of leverage and
maturity, as it stands in contrast to the typical REIT business model.
5.3 The determinants of maturity
Non-REIT maturity choices appear to be mainly driven by asset-matching and the
link to leverage in the sense of Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010). These two findings
are directly related. According to Kolb (1987), a strict observation of the matching
principle implies a current ratio of one, thereby increasing refinancing risk during
times of limited debt availability. Firms observing the leverage-maturity relation-
ship put forward in Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010) will also benefit from increased
protection from credit supply shocks. Firms that are at greatest risk from credit
supply shocks are firms that are highly levered with substantial short-term debt. If
firms with high leverage follow the ’default-risk’ theory, they will choose long-term
debt and so reduce refinancing risks. Similarly, firms with short-term debt will have
chosen short term debt because they have low leverage. Firms with low leverage also
face lower refinancing risks when confronted with credit supply shocks. This is not
surprising as the inability of a firm to refinance can be thought of a special case of
default. In this way, the ’default-risk’ model can also be thought of as a ’refinance-
risk’ model. Real estate companies have an added incentive to adhere to the positive
relationship between leverage and maturity so as to mitigate the refinancing risk
that partly results from the adherence to the asset matching principle.
The secure provision of funding for new projects and the management of refinancing
risk appear to dominate the maturity choices of real estate companies to the extent
of rendering most other traditional maturity theories insignificant. Contrary to a
number of US debt maturity studies, including Barclay and Smith (1995); Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005); Johnson (2003) and Billett, King, and Mauer
(2007), credit rating is insignificant as a predictor for maturity in our study. In a
3SLS setting, it becomes apparent that the positive leverage-maturity relationship
dominates the management of refinancing risk.
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Overall, real estate companies appear to pursue a more defensive maturity strategy
to ensure funding liquidity and manage refinancing risk, partly resulting from their
adherence to the asset-matching principle.
Contrary to Hart (1993), the maturity choices of real estate companies appear to
be positively related to the market-to-book ratio. We read this as a direct result of
the interaction between leverage and maturity, and it also appears to be the one
instance in which we find non-REITs to pursue a more offensive capital structure
strategy, albeit indirectly.
Consistent with theory and as reported above, we find support for an inverse re-
lationship between non-REIT growth opportunities and leverage so as to mitigate
agency costs of underinvestment. However, we also find evidence that, once leverage
decreases, non-REITs shorten maturity accordingly so as to reduce expected costs
of debt and refinancing risk in the sense of Alcock, Finn, and Tan (2010).
According to Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), leverage and maturity are substitutes
in the management of the underinvestment problem. Bearing in mind the positive
relationship identified between leverage and maturity, non-REIT capital structure
would naturally tend to over-correct maturity with respect to growth opportunities if
both these dimensions of capital structure were to be reduced. If this over-correction
is allowed to run its course, firms find themselves with low levels of leverage but also
with unnecessarily short maturities.
There are two main risks surrounding unnecessarily short maturities, refinancing risk
(the risk of not obtaining new funding) and the transaction costs involved in sourcing
new funding. The refinancing risk component is mitigated through the leverage-
maturity relationship. Non-REITs only use short-maturity debt if their leverage
levels are sufficiently low. Therefore, given that refinancing risk is controlled, non-
REITs have an opportunity here to indirectly reduce transaction costs in the sense
of Titman and Wessels (1988) by swapping short-term debt for equity.
Our interpretation in terms of a more opportunistic capital structure strategy is
further substantiated by the fact that a high market-to-book ratio can be interpreted
as a measure of strong growth opportunities but also as a measure of a high price-
to-NAV ratio and thus as an indicator that equity is relatively over-priced in the
public market, a situation that offers an incentive to decrease leverage following the
argument presented in Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010).
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The interpretation we suggest here can be reconciled with the lack of direct support
for the transaction cost-based argument of Titman and Wessels (1988) when we
assume that there is an incentive to optimise transaction costs irrespective of firm size
- but only once i) higher-priority, more defensive objectives such as the management
of underinvestment problems and refinancing risks have been achieved, which is in
line with the gerneal pattern we tend to find in non-REIT financing choices, and ii)
once maturity would otherwise fall below a certain threshold level.
Unlike real estate companies, REITs do not seem to follow the most common theory
of debt maturity. We do not find support for the asset matching principle so as to
ensure funding liquidity for new projects. The argument put forward in Kolb (1987)
implies that a looser observation of the matching principle indirectly acts as a tool
to mitigate refinancing risk. This argument is in line with the finding that REITs
do not appear to feel the need to match maturity to their chosen level of leverage
so as to (indirectly) reduce refinancing risk.
REITs appear to be less focused on the management of refinancing risk in general.
We do not find support for a positive relationship between REIT debt rating and
debt maturity either. Again, we can attribute this result to the regulatory situation
of REITs. Barclay and Smith (1995) argue that regulated firms can borrow longer
term debt because they face fewer debt-related agency problems. The regulation of
REITs appears to be a stronger indicator of access to long-term debt than credit
ratings and thus helps manage refinancing risk.
In contrast to our results for real estate companies, we find strong support for the
size- and transaction cost-based theory of debt maturity (Titman andWessels, 1988).
Larger REITs actively employ capital structure choices to exploit economies of scale
and optimise transaction costs by extending debt maturity.
This last insight allows us to explain the unusual inverse relationship between REIT
maturity and leverage. If REIT size increases, both maturity and leverage increase,
maturity by an opportunistic transaction cost argument, and leverage by the pecking
order argument outlined above. So, for a one unit increase in firm size, REITs will
eventually hold more debt and this debt is longer term. The increase in maturity is
not unwelcome, but in the absence of corporate taxes REITs do not have an incentive
to use that much debt (Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans, 2007).
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It appears that in this case, REITs follow an opportunistic cherry-picking strat-
egy - benefit from lower transaction costs that result from larger firm size if man-
agers subsequently increase maturity, but limit the increase in leverage resulting
from the stronger information asymmetry - a by-product of larger firm size. If we
view maturity and leverage as substitutes in the management of these information
asymmetry-related costs, along the lines of Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), then
the simultaneous increase in leverage and maturity for a one unit increase in firm
size overcorrects the capital structure with regard to what is required to mitigate
the higher asymmetry.
Leverage can then be reduced, conserving the beneficial impact of higher maturity
on transaction costs. Again, this strategy is predicated on the lack of any a priori
preference for a target debt level of REITs; leverage can be adjusted as a function
of a variety of factors. Further, in the Leland and Toft (1996) framework, firm value
also depends on bankruptcy costs. For REITs, the reduction in leverage is still in line
with their rationale, only that in this particular instance, firm value is maximised
by reducing leverage relative to maturity through reducing bankruptcy costs.
Overall, the capital structure choices of REITs appear to be more offensive than
those of real estate companies as the regulatory setting renders the mitigation of
corporate taxation obsolete, reduces agency conflicts, helps manage refinancing risk
and thus frees up flexibility in the capital structure to signal firm quality and optimise
transaction costs. Again, our results suggest that the relationship between leverage
and maturity can also be used to moderate the effects of other exogenous financing
policies.
6 Summary and conclusion
The contribution of this research to the existing capital structure literature is three-
fold. First, against the background of increasing theoretical support and empirical
evidence for a functional relationship between leverage and maturity choices, we
focus our analysis explicitly on the joint determination of these two dimensions of
capital structure in real estate firms. We find that this relationship is much richer
than often assumed. Second, we contrast and compare the capital structure choices
of REITs and non-REITs so as to illustrate the effects of regulation and taxation.
We find that the effects of the REIT regulation indeed appear to have a significant
impact on capital structure choices.
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Third, our analysis is carried out in a 3SLS setting, which allows us to accommodate
for any joint determination of leverage and maturity while improving the efficiency
of our estimates. The differences in our results to previous studies highlight the value
of 3SLS in exploring the interrelationship between leverage and maturity choices.
In summary, REITs seem to use the leverage dimension of capital structure to follow
the pecking order and secure cheaper funds, to actively signal firm quality and to
mitigate growth- and especially volatility-related agency costs. Equity-related agency
costs explain the inverse relationship between leverage and maturity. REIT maturity
choices appear to be mainly targeted at mitigating underinvestment problems and
exploiting economies of scale.
Unregulated real estate companies on the other hand have a higher exposure to debt-
related agency costs and are therefore more defensive in their capital structure. In
line with the trade-off theory, they focus on the mitigation of corporate taxes, which
implies that they prioritise the choice of a target level of leverage. This finding is
consistent with the positive relationship we confirm between leverage and maturity.
Non-REITs appear to largely tailor their capital structure choices to the timely
provision of funding for new projects, the management of debt-related agency costs
and the reduction of refinancing risk for a chosen level of leverage.
Generally, our results suggest that, in addition to the interpretation of leverage
and maturity as substitutes or complements, the relationship between leverage and
maturity can also be used to moderate the effects of other exogenous financing
policies.
Howe and Shilling (1988) argue that REITs cannot compete for debt as they cannot
benefit from the tax shields offered by interest payments. It has long puzzled re-
searchers why REITs still use debt, and in some cases substantially higher leverage
ratios than unregulated real estate companies. Our findings suggest that the regu-
latory setting and tax-exempt status of REITs provides sufficient flexibility in the
capital structure to exploit the benefits of a more offensive strategy and to offset the
comparatively higher net cost of debt.
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Fig. 1. Figure 1 compares the total costs (from Table ??) of issuing two different maturity of zero coupon
bonds (ZCBs) over a 2 year period. The solid line plots the total costs of issuing two successive 1 year
ZCBs while the dotted line plots the total costs of issuing one single 2 year ZCB for various levels of debt
leverage. Figure 1a and 1b graphically illustrate the difference between these two debt maturity strategies
for no bankruptcy costs firms and firms with simulated bankruptcy costs of 10%, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Cross-sectional view of the proportion of debt that matures in more than one, two, three, four and
five years from the fiscal year end for non-REITs.
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(b) Leverage Histogram for non-REITs
Fig. 3. Histograms of debt maturity and leverage are plotted using 916 firm-year observations for non-RE-
ITs over 1973 and 2006 from Compustat Database, in Figure 3a and in Figure 3b, respectively. Histogram of
debt maturity (Figure 3a) shows the distribution of debt maturity, measured by the proportion of long-term
debt (due more than three years) to total debt. Histogram of leverage (Figure 3b) shows the distribution
of leverage. Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to market value of assets, where market value
of assets is estimated as book value of total assets less book value of common equity plus market value of
common equity.
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Fig. 4. Cross-sectional view of the proportion of debt that matures in more than one, two, three, four and
five years from the fiscal year end for REITs.
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Fig. 5. Histograms of debt maturity and leverage are plotted using 189 firm-year observations for REITs
over 1973 and 2006 from Compustat Database, in Figure 3a and in Figure 3b, respectively. Histogram of
debt maturity (Figure 3a) shows the distribution of debt maturity, measured by the proportion of long-term
debt (due more than three years) to total debt. Histogram of leverage (Figure 3b) shows the distribution
of leverage. Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to market value of assets, where market value
of assets is estimated as book value of total assets less book value of common equity plus market value of
common equity.
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Risk Premium (%) and Total Cost of Debt
Debt Ratio Risk Premium Total Cost of Debt
(Debt/Assets) 1 2 5 10 2 x One Yr Z.C.B. Two Yr Z.C.B.
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 0.2100
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0028 0.2100 0.2100
20 0.0000 0.0001 0.0082 0.0288 0.2100 0.2100
30 0.0001 0.0051 0.0530 0.0892 0.2100 0.2101
40 0.0042 0.0482 0.1651 0.1832 0.2101 0.2111
50 0.0570 0.2118 0.3536 0.3069 0.2113 0.2147
55 0.1449 0.3687 0.4823 0.3759 0.2132 0.2181
60 0.3151 0.5814 0.6268 0.4462 0.2169 0.2228
65 0.6020 0.8700 0.7880 0.5287 0.2233 0.2292
70 1.0528 1.2386 0.9690 0.6098 0.2333 0.2374
75 1.7117 1.6824 1.1671 0.6964 0.2480 0.2473
80 2.5509 2.2095 1.3740 0.7846 0.3224 0.2882
85 3.6546 2.8190 1.6015 0.8690 0.2917 0.2728
90 4.9944 3.4970 1.8399 0.9647 0.3224 0.2882
95 6.5350 4.2392 2.0800 1.0608 0.3580 0.3051
100 8.3387 5.0293 2.3326 1.1507 0.4004 0.3232
Table 1
The default-risk premium (λ) and total cost of issuing zero coupon bonds (ZCB) over two years for various
levels of leverage and maturity. Default risk premia are calculated using (2). Firm value is assumed to follow
lognormal distribution with a standard deviation (σ) of 30% per year and a risk free rate (rf) of 10% per
year.
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Distribution of Corporate Debt Maturity and
Descriptive Statistics of Non-REITs Characteristics, 1973-2006
Panel A: Distribution of Percentage of Total Debt Maturing from the Fiscal Year End
Std. Percentile
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th Median 75th Max
Percent of Debt that Matures in
> 1 year 0.72 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.82 0.94 1.00
> 2 years 0.58 0.30 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.86 0.99
> 3 years 0.47 0.31 0.00 0.20 0.47 0.76 0.97
> 4 years 0.40 0.30 0.00 0.12 0.37 0.67 0.96
> 5 years 0.34 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.58 0.94
Panel B: Distribution of Percentage of Total Debt Maturing from the Fiscal Year End
Std. Percentile
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th Median 75th Max
Firm Value ($mil) 245.61 630.09 0.63 19.72 51.63 161.96 8,653.05
Debt Maturity 0.47 0.31 0.00 0.20 0.47 0.76 0.97
Leverage 0.40 0.23 0.01 0.21 0.39 0.58 0.89
Log of Asset Maturity 3.14 0.81 0.83 2.66 3.18 3.60 5.25
Market-to-book 1.42 0.94 0.54 0.90 1.08 1.56 6.18
Abnormal Earnings 0.02 0.68 −3.05 −0.07 0.00 0.06 3.53
Log of Firm Value 4.16 1.60 0.83 3.00 3.97 5.18 8.06
Firm Volatility 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.40
Term Structure 1.56 1.26 −1.49 0.62 1.65 2.62 3.49
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.46 0.28 0.02 0.21 0.45 0.70 0.95
Profitability 0.08 0.09 −0.27 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.30
Proportion of firm-years with
Operating Loss Carryforwards 0.29 0.45
Investment Tax Credit 0.16 0.37
Debt Rating 0.03 0.18
Table 2
The table reports distribution of corporate debt maturity (Panel A) and descriptive statistic (Panel B) for
916 firm-year observations of non-REITs (non Real Estate Investment Trusts) between 1973 and 2006 from
Compustat Database. Non-REITs are firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 6500
to 6552. Variables are defined as: Debt Maturity is measured by the proportion of debt maturity due in
more than three years. Leverage is the ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to
market value of assets, where market value of assets is estimated as book value of total assets less book value
of common equity plus market value of common equity. Log of Asset Maturity is measured by the natural
logarithm of the ratio of depreciable assets to depreciation. Market-to-book is measured by the market value
of assets divided by the book value of assets. Abnormal Earnings is the difference between earning per share
in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t share price. Log of Firm Size is measured
by the natural logarithm of the market firm value in millions of dollars. Dollar values are inflation-adjusted
(June 1982) using the the Producer Price Index (PPI). Firm Volatility is measured by the standard deviation
of first differences in EBITDA over the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets for
that period. Term Structure is the difference between the month-end yields on a 10-year government bond
and a 6-month government bond, matched to the month of a firm’s fiscal year end. Bond yields are from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s economic database (FRED). Each of the dummy variables (operating
loss carryforwards, investment tax credit and debt rating) equals 1 if the firm has its respective items, 0
otherwise.
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Distribution of Corporate Debt Maturity and
Descriptive Statistics of REITs Characteristics, 1973-2006
Panel A: Distribution of Percentage of Total Debt Maturing from the Fiscal Year End
Std. Percentile
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th Median 75th Max
Percent of Debt that Matures in
> 1 year 0.80 0.27 0.00 0.80 0.93 0.97 1.00
> 2 years 0.71 0.28 0.00 0.62 0.82 0.91 1.00
> 3 years 0.62 0.29 0.00 0.44 0.71 0.86 1.00
> 4 years 0.55 0.29 0.00 0.34 0.62 0.79 1.00
> 5 years 0.48 0.29 0.00 0.23 0.51 0.74 1.00
Panel B: Distribution of Percentage of Total Debt Maturing from the Fiscal Year End
Std. Percentile
Characteristic Mean Dev. Min 25th Median 75th Max
Firm Value ($mil) 1,895*** 3,234 3.70 102.23 389.63 2,609.36 18,837.41
Debt Maturity 0.62*** 0.29 0.00 0.44 0.71 0.86 1.00
Leverage 0.43 0.22 0.01 0.27 0.42 0.58 0.90
Log of Asset Maturity 3.26 0.91 0.53 2.93 3.19 3.84 5.76
Market-to-book 1.26* 0.34 0.47 1.03 1.26 1.44 2.35
Abnormal Earnings 0.12 0.74 −1.16 −0.02 0.01 0.05 5.66
Log of Firm Value 6.00*** 1.98 1.80 4.43 5.97 7.58 9.86
Firm Volatility 0.04*** 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.27
Term Structure 1.59 1.25 −1.49 0.72 1.65 2.62 3.42
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.58*** 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.64 0.80 0.96
Profitability 0.09 0.06 −0.12 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.29
Proportion of firm-years with
Operating Loss Carryforwards 0.15*** 0.36
Investment Tax Credit 0.24** 0.43
Debt Rating 0.22*** 0.42
Table 3
The table reports distribution of corporate debt maturity (Panel A) and descriptive statistic (Panel B) for
916 firm-year observations of REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) between 1973 and 2006 from Compustat
Database. REITs are firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of 6798. Variables are defined
as: Debt Maturity is measured by the proportion of debt maturity due in more than three years. Leverage
is the ratio of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to market value of assets, where
market value of assets is estimated as book value of total assets less book value of common equity plus
market value of common equity. Log of Asset Maturity is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio
of depreciable assets to depreciation. Market-to-book is measured by the market value of assets divided
by the book value of assets. Abnormal Earnings is the difference between earning per share in year t+1
minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t share price. Log of Firm Size is measured by the
natural logarithm of the market firm value in millions of dollars. Dollar values are inflation-adjusted (June
1982) using the the Producer Price Index (PPI). Firm Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of
first differences in EBITDA over the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets for that
period. Term Structure is the difference between the month-end yields on a 10-year government bond and
a 6-month government bond, matched to the month of a firm’s fiscal year end. Bond yields are from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s economic database (FRED). Each of the dummy variables (operating
loss carryforwards, investment tax credit and debt rating) equals 1 if the firm has its respective items, 0
otherwise. Asterisks on the means of REITs indicate whether they are significantly different from those of
non-REITs. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% level, 1% level and 0.1% level, respectively.
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Pearson Correlation Matrix Among Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables for Non-REITs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Debt Maturity 1
(2) Leverage 0.11∗∗∗ 1
(3) Log of Asset Maturity 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 1
(4) Market-to-book 0.09∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.02 1
(5) Abnormal Earnings −0.06 0.03 0.03 −0.03 1
(6) Log of Firm Value 0.14∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.04 0.24∗∗∗ −0.03 1
(7) Volatility −0.17∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.06 −0.30∗∗∗ 1
(8) Term Structure 0.00 −0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 1
(9) Fixed Assets Ratio 0.29∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06 0.04 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.05 1
(10) Profitability 0.15∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.10∗∗ 0.03 −0.10∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.02 0.14∗∗∗ 1
(11) Dummy Operating Loss Carryforward −0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.05 0.02 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 1
(12) Dummy Investment Tax Credit −0.03 −0.08∗ −0.05 −0.08∗ −0.02 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.02 0.11∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ 1
(13) Dummy Debt Rating 0.03 0.07∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.03 0.04 0.25∗∗∗ −0.04 0.04 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05 −0.05
Table 4: The table reports Pearson correlation among dependent and independent variables of leverage and debt maturity for 916 firm-year observations for non-REITs between 1973
and 2006 from Compustat Database. All variables are defined in Table 2. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% level, 1% level and 0.1% level, respectively.
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0
Pearson Correlation Matrix Among Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables for REITs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Debt Maturity 1
(2) Leverage −0.09 1
(3) Log of Asset Maturity 0.25∗∗∗ −0.14 1
(4) Market-to-book 0.19∗∗ −0.18∗ 0.13 1
(5) Abnormal Earnings −0.16∗ 0.31∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.1 1
(6) Log of Firm Value 0.28∗∗∗ 0.13 −0.03 0.41∗∗∗ 0.07 1
(7) Volatility −0.39∗∗∗ 0 −0.19∗∗ −0.06 0.49∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 1
(8) Term Structure −0.08 0.04 −0.12 −0.04 −0.03 0.06 −0.08 1
(9) Fixed Assets Ratio 0.39∗∗∗ −0.01 0.71∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.33∗∗∗ −0.07 1
(10) Profitability 0.12 −0.14∗ 0.14 0.26∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.04 −0.14 −0.14 0.17∗ 1
(11) Dummy Operating Loss Carryforward −0.02 0.1 0 −0.14 −0.06 −0.19∗∗ 0.02 −0.12 −0.01 −0.12 1
(12) Dummy Investment Tax Credit 0.33∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.01 0.04 −0.08 −0.01 −0.17∗ −0.07 −0.01 0.01 −0.24∗∗∗ 1
(13) Dummy Debt Rating 0.12 0.12 −0.14 0.13 0.26∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.02 0 −0.03 −0.05 −0.18∗
Table 5: The table reports Pearson correlation among dependent and independent variables of leverage and debt maturity for 189 firm-year observations for REITs between 1973 and
2006 from Compustat Database. All variables are defined in Table 2. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% level, 1% level and 0.1% level, respectively.
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Three-stage Least Squares Regression Results
Predicted sign Non-REITs REITs
Variables Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
Leverage (+) 0.653** -0.063
(0.21) (0.22)
Debt Maturity (+) -0.004 -0.222*
(0.10) (0.11)
Log of Asset Maturity (+) 0.037** 0.009
(0.01) (0.02)
Market-to-book (−) (−) -0.113*** 0.104*** -0.129* 0.022
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Abnormal Earnings (+) (−) 0.002 -0.021 0.109*** 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Log of Firm Value (−) (+) 0.007 0.006 0.025** 0.066***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Volatility (−) (−) -0.491*** -0.310 -1.120** -1.390**
(0.11) (0.19) (0.42) (0.44)
Term Structure (+) 0.004 0.000
(0.02) (0.03)
Debt Rating Dummy (−) 0.028 0.079
(0.06) (0.05)
Fixed Assets Ratio (+) 0.151*** 0.097
(0.04) (0.07)
Profitability (−) -0.009 -0.065
(0.08) (0.24)
Operating Loss Carryforwards Dummy (−) 0.048** 0.062
(0.02) (0.04)
Investment Tax Credit Dummy (−) -0.064*** -0.049
(0.02) (0.04)
Constant 0.492*** -0.067 0.566*** 0.506**
(0.04) (0.14) (0.08) (0.19)
Observations 916 916 189 189
R2 0.279 0.034 0.195 0.544
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes
Pagan-Hall statistic (p-value) 0.984 0.266 0.140 0.071
Table 6
The table shows the three-stage least squares regression results with the coefficients for the explanatory
variables (standard errors). The regression results are based on 916 (189) firm-year observations for non-
REITs (REITs) over the period of 1973 to 2006. The Pagan-Hall test (p-value) examines the null hypothesis
that error terms are homoscedastic.
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